From an economic perspective, the Americans and Iranians are currently playing a political match, the sixth round of which is about to be held under the skies of the Omani capital, Muscat. The two players are trying to score points that will secure a final outcome for each player, from their own perspective and interests. The economy has been the mediator through which the two players have agreed to play the match, each on its own terms, similar to what happened between Washington and Kiev with the minerals agreement.
However, this is not the direct topic of today’s discussion, although it does come as a subset of the US-Iranian rivalry. It concerns the active non-state actors in the Middle East supported by Iran and adopting political positions aligned with Iranian trends: the Palestinian Hamas movement, the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, and the Yemeni Houthi group.
Iran is the closest thing to being the main trainer of these actors, but it must be recognized that they – the actors – are suffering from a major rift in their capabilities and field capacity in the conflict zones.
For example: Hamas in 2025 is no longer the Hamas it was before October 7, 2023, as it has lost a large part of its military and combat structure, as well as its human cadres from the first to the third ranks, in addition to the fact that its field situation inside Palestine has been greatly affected by the human and material losses suffered by the Gaza Strip.
The same applies to the Lebanese Hezbollah, which also suffered disasters, particularly in 2024.
Hezbollah may still be a factor in the equation, but not as much as it was in previous periods.
The same applies to the Houthi group, which remains a factor in the equation and continues to pose a threat to the Yemeni interior, in addition to some Shiite militias in Iraq.
What is position of these movements on the US-Iranian negotiations?
What is the position of these movements regarding the American-Iranian negotiations?
What is the position of these movements if the Americans reach an agreement with the Iranians? And what will be their position if the Americans and Iranians do not? Given that the success or failure of this agreement is now on an even keel, and given that both sides—the Americans and Iranians—have announced that their negotiations concern only two issues: Tehran’s nuclear program and the sanctions imposed by Washington, while other issues such as Iran’s regional activity in the Middle East through these movements or even Iran’s long-range missile production, were not mentioned as being up for negotiation, although Washington has resorted to a strategy of tightening the ties, and the Trump administration has agreed to negotiate directly with the Houthis regarding halting attacks on ships in the Red Sea.
Hamas
The Palestinian Gaza Strip is still searching for a way out of its catastrophic historical crisis, and its residents are still awaiting a decision that will halt the ongoing massacre against them. It seems that the Americans have a solution in mind for them: permanently leaving their land and transforming it into a Middle Eastern Riviera, blessed with bright sunshine and warm Mediterranean waters.
Amidst this, Hamas faces the dilemma of relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and withdrawing its members from it, in addition to replacing its government with the Palestinian National Authority or an international, or perhaps Arab, administration.
Hezbollah
Attention has been focused on the Lebanese Hezbollah party since its intervention to support Hamas against Israel following October 7. As a result of escalating confrontations between the party and Tel Aviv, the assassination of several of its leaders, most notably Hassan Nasrallah, its former Secretary-General, and the pressure exerted by some Lebanese forces on the escalation, Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on the condition that it relinquish its weapons, restricting the use of weapons inside Lebanon to the official state.
Recently, the party’s position on the issue of weapons has become more rigid, indicating the possibility of it failing to fulfill its commitments. This rigidity has been evident in the face of Joseph Aoun, the President of the Lebanese Republic, as well as in the face of Nawaf Salam’s government. These positions have been supported by other movements in the region, including the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the Houthi group in Yemen, The situation even reached the point where the Iranian ambassador to Beirut issued a statement refusing to disarm the party. For its part, the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned the head of Iranian diplomacy accredited to Lebanon that he had no connection to the matter after summoning him.
Houthis
The Houthis refuse to engage with Yemeni state institutions. They successfully negotiated with the Americans and halted the war without abandoning some of their conditions. They only halted the war against American ships, not against Israeli ships and the State of Israel, In addition, it has proven its ability to halt Israeli air traffic and force all of its cities’ residents to take shelter, from its north on the Mediterranean Sea to its south on the Red Sea, from its missile platforms located near the Indian Ocean. This does not mean, however, that its infrastructure and the Yemeni state’s infrastructure will be subjected to massive destruction, the repair of which will require years and tens of billions of dollars.
The Houthis also continue to adopt the discourse of what is known as “resistance.” All statements issued by this Yemeni movement reiterate this concept and identify resistance fronts in the areas surrounding Israel, namely Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. The Houthis maintain that these fronts—according to the movement’s policy—are directly connected to the Israeli enemy.
Is there a connection between the evolution of these movements’ positions and the US-Iranian rivalry?
Sources say that Hezbollah’s recent escalation of its stance toward accepting a ceasefire in exchange for disarmament, followed by its subsequent shift to intransigence in the face of this trend, has a direct connection to the current US-Iranian negotiation.
The same applies to the Houthi announcement that they would stop targeting American ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea.
While Hamas’s position remains the least maneuverable, and the options available to its leaders remain very limited, it remains an indirect link to the ongoing conflict between the US and Iran.
How will the outcome of the match affect these movements?
The outcome of the US-Iran match will be reflected in Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, albeit to varying degrees, depending on the outcome of the match itself—whether it ends with a US-Iran agreement or not—in addition to the proximity of these movements to Israel’s geographic vicinity, the cards each movement holds, and their ability to maneuver.
