The rise and rise of the Houthis
Formally known as Ansar Allah, the Houthi rebels have risen from a small and obscure group founded by a former member of the Yemeni parliament into a military force that now claims nearly two thirds of Yemen, including the Red Sea coast and the capital Sanaa. At sea they control the area from the Gulf of Aden to the northern part of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the entryway to the Red Sea and to the Suez Canal, a pivotal waterway where between 12 and 15 per cent of global trade and about 20 per cent of container shipments transit every year.
Houthi militias were initially seen by both Yemeni rivals and regional powers as a negligible lightly armed group confined to caves and mountaintops. But the group’s leadership began to capitalise on flimsy links to Shiitism and align themselves with predominately Shiite Iran, a regional military heavyweight readily cultivating proxies to counterbalance a US-led alliance in the area.
From 2004 onwards, the group’s fighters have been gaining in military prowess, beginning with their involvement in a protracted struggle with the previous secular Yemeni regime and later against a well-funded military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi-led campaign began in spring 2015 and mostly relied on US weapons shipments. In 2019, the Houthis launched daring attacks – using more advanced weapons and drones – on Saudi oil facilities. These assaults forced Riyadh to shut down two of its main oil facilities and remove five per cent of the country’s oil production from the market.
The war failed to oust the Houthis and the Saudis began to de-escalate in 2023. The botched adventure instead strengthened the Houthis’ hand and pushed them further into the arms of Iran.
The Houthis have placed themselves on the international agenda again by inserting themselves into the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict. Since November, the group has targeted ships passing through the narrow waters of Bab el-Mandeb towards the Suez Canal. The Houthis lack a navy or an air force, and instead use drones and anti-ship missiles to launch their attacks. In one instance, they filmed themselves using a helicopter to board and capture an Israeli cargo ship, later turning it into a local tourist destination.
The group claims to target only those vessels heading to Israeli ports because, they say, Israel prevents food and medicine entering Gaza. In response, the US and the UK, with support from allies, launched airstrikes against Yemeni targets at sea and later on land. This in turn has intensified fears of an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, which is responsible for 31 per cent of the world’s oil supply, while the Middle East and North Africa region produces 29 per cent of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). The US maintains that it is defending freedom of navigation and is working to ‘restore America’s deterrence’ in the region.
‘Without a formal declaration of war, various legal issues are left in a grey area, particularly from a contractual perspective,’ says Wesley Wood, Regional Representative Middle East on the IBA Maritime and Transport Law Committee and a partner at Al Tamimi & Company in Dubai, who refers to the situation as an ‘unusual’ conflict. ‘Whilst much of the conflict is being carried out at sea, it is customary international law, including, inter alia, the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention, which will regulate the parties’ actions, particularly those of the state actors involved.’
The Houthis have not backed down and still insist that only a credible Israel-Gaza ceasefire would resolve frictions in the Red Sea. The UK and the US have imposed sanctions on leaders of the group while, in mid-January, the latter relisted the group as a terrorist organisation. This has prompted the Houthi authorities in Yemen to order UN and other humanitarian staff holding US and UK passports to leave the country within a month.
Supply chain pain
The biggest impact has been on trade traffic in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Commercial vessels are now mostly bypassing the route altogether, preferring to take the more costly and much longer passage around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. A statement made in late January by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that weekly Suez Canal transits had dropped by 42 per cent over the previous two months.
Oil and gas exporters in the Middle East have also been affected. The US Energy Information Administration says that 12 per cent of seaborne oil trade and eight per cent of LNG trade to the US and Europe passed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the first half of 2023. Prior to the crisis, two or three gas carriers would sail through the region daily, according to UNCTAD. As of mid-January, LNG carriers have almost entirely ceased using the Red Sea.
