Libya, still mired in chaos, has seen its capital once again descend into bloodshed. On Monday night, the streets of Tripoli turned into battlegrounds, forcing residents to hide indoors\u2014a scene more reminiscent of war than of a functioning state. So what happened this time? And who bears the political responsibility for this recurring security collapse?<\/p>\n
The latest clashes broke out between rival security factions, each claiming legitimacy and discipline, while reality reveals a fragile balance of terror. Why do these violent episodes erupt whenever there\u2019s talk of restructuring institutions or holding elections? Is this just a security incident, or the symptom of a much deeper political crisis?<\/p>\n
Tripoli\u2019s central municipal council called for an immediate ceasefire, describing the capital as a \u201cwar zone\u201d and warning of growing divisions. But is a mere statement enough to stop the destruction? Where is the central authority capable of enforcing peace?<\/p>\n
The UN Support Mission in Libya and the US Embassy issued swift condemnations. Yet are these reactions enough? Doesn\u2019t Libya now need a more robust and actionable international intervention?<\/p>\n
Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi met with a delegation from Souk al-Jumaa, a hard-hit Tripoli district. The delegation sharply criticized Dbeibah\u2019s government, accusing it of targeting disciplined security forces. Does this indicate a crack at the top of Libya\u2019s political structure? Is the Presidential Council starting to push back against Dbeibah\u2019s dominance?<\/p>\n
In the midst of the crisis, Dbeibah posted that “legitimate institutions” had prevailed. But over whom, exactly? Who defines what is \u201clegitimate\u201d when many of the fighting factions are part of the same government security structure? Has Dbeibah become a manager of militia balances instead of a state builder?<\/p>\n
Prime Ministerial candidate Abdelbasset Guemati called the situation a \u201ctragedy\u201d and accused Dbeibah of both political and security failure, using the state as a cover for corruption. Do these criticisms mark a turning point in Libya\u2019s political discourse? Or are they merely rhetorical without any real alternative on the ground?<\/p>\n
Parliamentarian Ali al-Takbali openly declared that Dbeibah benefits from chaos and cannot be part of any genuine reconciliation process. Tripoli, he said, is suffocating under a heavy burden of armed balances. Is this view representative of broader sentiment in Parliament, or a lone voice?<\/p>\n
What\u2019s happening in Tripoli reflects a deeper institutional disintegration: two governments, two security structures, competing claims of legitimacy, and militias dividing cities. Can we still speak of a unified state? Who blocks the unification of security forces? And is the solution still in Libyan hands, or controlled by external backers?<\/p>\n
Morocco previously hosted several rounds of inter-Libyan dialogue, from the Skhirat Agreement to the Bouznika rounds. But why did these agreements not translate into action? Who obstructed them? Is it time to launch a new political track, one that dismantles militias rather than accommodates them?<\/p>\n
Tripoli is not just a capital under fire\u2014it is a symbol of a nation on the brink. Without genuine political will and effective international engagement, Libya faces a binary future: either an inclusive dialogue based on renewed popular legitimacy, or a descent into deeper fragmentation and violence.<\/p>\n
Who will move first before it\u2019s too late? And what kind of Libya do we want to see tomorrow?<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Libya, still mired in chaos, has seen its capital once again descend into bloodshed. On Monday night, the streets of Tripoli turned into battlegrounds, forcing residents to hide indoors\u2014a scene more reminiscent of war than of a functioning state. So what happened this time? And who bears the political responsibility for this recurring security collapse? […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2847,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2846","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2846","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2846"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2846\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2848,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2846\/revisions\/2848"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2847"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2846"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2846"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2846"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}