{"id":3456,"date":"2025-11-25T10:33:18","date_gmt":"2025-11-25T10:33:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/?p=3456"},"modified":"2025-11-25T12:38:29","modified_gmt":"2025-11-25T12:38:29","slug":"the-religious-delegation-to-tindouf-how-the-polisario-is-becoming-a-node-in-irans-expanding-influence-network","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/the-religious-delegation-to-tindouf-how-the-polisario-is-becoming-a-node-in-irans-expanding-influence-network\/","title":{"rendered":"The Religious Delegation to Tindouf: How the Polisario Is Becoming a Node in Iran\u2019s Expanding Influence Network"},"content":{"rendered":"

The recent visit of a Lebanese-Syrian religious delegation<\/strong> closely affiliated with Hezbollah<\/em> to the Polisario-run camps in Tindouf is far from an ordinary spiritual encounter. It reflects a deeper strategic alignment between the separatist movement and Iran\u2019s multi-layered influence networks seeking to extend their reach across Northwest Africa.<\/p>\n

Images shared by the Polisario\u2019s media outlet attempted to portray the event as a cultural-religious gathering. However, the identity of the guests \u2014 including Sheikh Hussam Al Ali<\/strong>, Moussa Al Khalaf<\/strong>, Salem Dabboussi<\/strong>, Mohammad Al Rafei<\/strong>, and Hadid Khalaf Al Darwish<\/strong> \u2014 makes it clear that this visit carries heavy geopolitical significance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Beyond Symbolic Diplomacy: An Ideological and Strategic Alignment<\/strong><\/h3>\n

These figures belong to the cultural and confessional circles that gravitate around the Tehran\u2013Hezbollah axis.
Their presence in Tindouf is therefore not merely ceremonial. It signals:<\/p>\n

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    the Polisario\u2019s willingness to integrate into a broader transnational network;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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    and Iran\u2019s interest in projecting influence into the Maghreb and the Sahel through new proxies.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    American intelligence and research institutions have closed the debate<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    Reports issued in recent months by prominent U.S. think tanks \u2014 notably the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)<\/strong> \u2014 have reinforced the credibility of long-standing accusations:<\/p>\n

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      religious and military channels<\/strong> linking Iran and the Polisario ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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      training of Polisario fighters by Hezbollah in Syria<\/strong> ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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      the detention of hundreds of Polisario members<\/strong> during the Syrian conflict ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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      explicit statements from a Polisario representative in 2022 about Iran supplying armed drones<\/strong>, later corroborated by Morocco\u2019s UN mission ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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      verifiable connections with extremist groups in the Sahel, including the trajectory of Adnan Abu Walid Al-Sahraoui<\/strong>, who moved from Polisario ranks to leading ISIS in the region.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      These elements show an emerging architecture combining separatism, radicalization, and proxy warfare.<\/p>\n

      Algeria\u2019s strategic ambiguity is becoming harder to justify<\/strong><\/h3>\n

      Algeria continues to declare that it maintains distance from Iran\u2019s ideological agenda.
      Yet it provides safe haven to a movement whose ties with Tehran and Hezbollah are increasingly documented.<\/p>\n

      This contradiction exposes a structural ambiguity in Algeria\u2019s regional posture and reduces its diplomatic credibility, especially as these developments occur on its own soil<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

      A growing debate in Washington: Should the Polisario be listed as a foreign terrorist organization?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

      The visit unfolds at a time when the U.S. Congress is examining a bipartisan bill introduced by Joe Wilson<\/strong> and Jimmy Panetta<\/strong>, calling for the designation of the Polisario Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

      Supporting documents underline:<\/p>\n

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        the movement\u2019s alignment with Iran and Hezbollah ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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        its intersections with jihadist actors in the Sahel ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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        and the rocket attacks recorded near the Algerian border during the 2024 Green March anniversary.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Conclusion: The Polisario is no longer a mere separatist movement<\/strong><\/h3>\n

        This episode confirms that:<\/p>\n

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        • \n

          the Polisario has evolved beyond its original separatist narrative ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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          it now functions as a component of a wider geopolitical matrix<\/strong> shaped by Iran\u2019s regional ambitions ;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          and the argument for labeling it a terrorist organization is gaining traction in U.S. strategic circles, connecting North African security with Washington\u2019s broader regional interests.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

          The recent visit of a Lebanese-Syrian religious delegation closely affiliated with Hezbollah to the Polisario-run camps in Tindouf is far from an ordinary spiritual encounter. It reflects a deeper strategic alignment between the separatist movement and Iran\u2019s multi-layered influence networks seeking to extend their reach across Northwest Africa. Images shared by the Polisario\u2019s media outlet […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3457,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,41,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3456","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-middle-east","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3456","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3456"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3456\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3458,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3456\/revisions\/3458"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3457"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3456"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3456"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3456"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}