The Moroccan government is moving toward redefining the legal boundaries of the digital sphere at a moment when the smartphone has become a direct competitor to television, newspapers, and radio in shaping public opinion. The draft amendment to the audiovisual communication law, which the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Communication says has been fully drafted, and the separate bill targeting false information appear, on the surface, to be a logical response to technological changes that have outpaced the existing legal framework. Yet when the different elements are viewed together, the issue appears broader than simply filling a legal gap: the state is preparing to bring a space long dominated by platforms, users, and algorithms into a national regulatory framework in which responsibilities are defined, the regulatory authority is identified, and foreign platforms are required to deal with the state under its legal rules.<\/p>\n
The central idea was already visible in May 2025, when Minister Mohamed Mehdi Bensaid presented the outlines of the project before Parliament. He spoke then of an integrated national framework for regulating digital content, expanding the powers of the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA), and requiring platforms targeting Moroccan audiences to designate a legal representative in Morocco. He also referred to content-moderation mechanisms, protection of minors, and measures dealing with illegal content, drawing in part on the European experience with the Digital Services Act. These details matter because they show that the project did not emerge as an improvised response to a particular incident. It reflects a broader conception of the relationship between the state and digital platforms: platforms that have been able to operate above national borders without a direct legal interlocutor would, under the proposed framework, be required to have a legal presence and a form of accountability within Morocco.<\/p>\n
This is where the first deeper intention behind the project becomes visible: the state wants to reclaim part of its sovereignty over the information space<\/strong>. The issue for policymakers is no longer simply that an individual may publish false information. The deeper problem is that global companies control the infrastructure through which millions of Moroccans receive information, while an algorithm can give an anonymous video an audience greater than that of a professional media organization. HACA President Latifa Akharbach has described this transformation in similar terms, pointing to the evolution of major platforms from mere technical intermediaries into \u201cstructural actors\u201d in the formation of the public sphere, alongside the decline of traditional mediation, the acceleration of media time, and the rise of disinformation. The proposal to expand HACA\u2019s powers is therefore not merely an administrative detail; it reflects an attempt to establish a national institution positioned at the intersection of technology, media, politics, and the public interest.<\/p>\n Yet the project contains a delicate contradiction. The state insists that it does not intend to undermine freedom of expression, a position repeatedly stated by officials, while simultaneously giving itself broader legal tools to monitor content and establish the responsibilities of digital actors. That is why declared intentions alone are not enough. The real issue lies in the definitions. What exactly constitutes \u201cfalse information\u201d? Is it information whose falsity has been established judicially, information later shown to be inaccurate, or content that an administrative authority considers misleading? At what point does journalistic error become disinformation? And when does sharp political criticism become content deemed capable of threatening \u201csocial cohesion\u201d? These are not theoretical questions. The broader the legal concepts, the greater the margin of discretion available to those responsible for enforcing them.<\/p>\n The sensitivity of the issue increases further with the existence of a second bill addressing false information, developed alongside the reform of the Criminal Code. The connection between the two texts follows a legal logic: the government wants to avoid contradictions between legislation specifically addressing the digital sphere and general criminal provisions, which explains the coordination with the Ministry of Justice. But the result could be a multi-layered legal framework capable of addressing the same content through several different channels. For journalists and citizens alike, the question will therefore no longer be simply whether a law exists, but how far the different legal provisions can overlap.<\/p>\n The issue, moreover, goes beyond false information. The initial project presented by the ministry also covered violence, hate speech, content inappropriate for minors, misleading advertising, and privacy, alongside disinformation. It is difficult to challenge the legitimacy of these objectives in principle. Platforms themselves are increasingly facing international pressure to assume greater responsibility for the content they host and distribute. In June 2026, HACA itself called on digital platforms to stop monetizing media disinformation, arguing that they possess the technical means to identify accounts and content generating revenue through manipulation of information or impersonation of media outlets.<\/p>\n But the difference between regulating a platform and regulating public opinion ultimately depends on who holds the final decision-making power. If platforms are required to modify or remove certain content under Moroccan law, if HACA receives broader powers, and if the publication of certain material becomes subject to criminal provisions, the state will have moved from a model that primarily punishes violations after they occur to a preventive architecture for governing content<\/strong>. This may be the most significant shift contained in the project, because it changes the relationship between citizens and the digital sphere: the internet gradually ceases to be a grey area outside the media system and becomes part of the public domain subject to national regulation.<\/p>\n The timing adds another dimension. Morocco is heading toward legislative elections on September 23, 2026. HACA has already adopted a decision intended to guarantee political pluralism during the electoral period running from August 15 to September 22 and has established detailed rules concerning electoral programming and political expression within audiovisual services. This does not mean that the platform laws were designed specifically for the coming elections; the broader reform process predates them. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that the state is entering an electoral period fully aware that political competition no longer takes place only through television channels, newspapers, or party rallies. It also unfolds through short videos, anonymous accounts, targeted advertising, artificial intelligence, and rumors capable of spreading before any verification mechanism can catch up.<\/p>\n This is where the potential political value of the reform for the government becomes apparent: reducing the ability of information chaos to produce a political reality independent of traditional institutions<\/strong>. Political power is no longer dealing only with journalism organizations that have a publisher and a legally identifiable responsibility. It must also contend with an influencer who can reach millions from a bedroom, an anonymous page capable of triggering a nationwide debate, or a fabricated video attributing statements to a public official that were never made. The objective, therefore, is to establish rules capable of identifying this new form of influence and assigning responsibility for it.<\/p>\n Yet this legitimate objective can become problematic if combating disinformation turns into a monopoly over defining truth. A democracy does not need a digital space without rules; it needs rules that do not give political power the exclusive authority to decide what may or may not be said. The value of Morocco\u2019s future legislation will therefore be measured less by the number of its provisions than by the guarantees built into them: the independence of the regulator, precise definitions, proportional sanctions, the right to appeal, protection of investigative journalism, and safeguards against using the concept of \u201cfalse information\u201d to punish a good-faith mistake or an inconvenient political opinion.<\/p>\n The Moroccan state is not starting from scratch. HACA has accumulated extensive experience in regulating audiovisual media and political pluralism, and it is now being pushed to rethink its role in response to the digital transformation. The real challenge therefore lies not simply in adding new powers to the authority, but in its ability to move from a culture of monitoring audiovisual broadcasting to a culture of governing a complete digital ecosystem whose speed, tools, and actors are fundamentally different.<\/p>\n What the government is ultimately doing is redefining the very meaning of media. The journalist is no longer the only producer of information, television is no longer the only institution capable of commanding an audience, and the platform is no longer merely a technical intermediary. All of them are gradually entering the same legal space, though with different levels of responsibility. This transformation may be necessary to protect citizens from disinformation and professional journalism from digital disorder, provided that protecting society does not become a pretext for narrowing the public sphere.<\/p>\n The decisive question, therefore, is no longer whether the government wants to \u201cregulate social media.\u201d That much is clear. The real question is how it intends to regulate it, and who will regulate those who regulate?<\/strong> If the objective is to contain a digital disorder that is undermining the quality of information, Morocco genuinely needs such a reform. But if regulation becomes a means of defining in advance the boundaries of political and social debate, the state will have done more than regulate the digital sphere: it will have redrawn the boundaries of the public sphere itself. The distance between these two objectives is narrow. It is the law itself, its application, the role of the judiciary, and the ability of the press and society to scrutinize the exercise of regulatory power that will ultimately determine which side of that boundary Morocco chooses.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Moroccan government is moving toward redefining the legal boundaries of the digital sphere at a moment when the smartphone has become a direct competitor to television, newspapers, and radio in shaping public opinion. The draft amendment to the audiovisual communication law, which the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Communication says has been fully drafted, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":4719,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,43,42,41,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4718","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-asia-americas","category-europe-russia","category-middle-east","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4718","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4718"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4718\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4720,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4718\/revisions\/4720"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4719"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4718"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4718"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4718"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}