{"id":4721,"date":"2026-08-18T19:48:09","date_gmt":"2026-08-18T19:48:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/?p=4721"},"modified":"2026-08-18T19:48:09","modified_gmt":"2026-08-18T19:48:09","slug":"from-russian-gas-to-the-moroccan-pipeline-has-morocco-entered-the-heart-of-europes-geopolitical-energy-battle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/from-russian-gas-to-the-moroccan-pipeline-has-morocco-entered-the-heart-of-europes-geopolitical-energy-battle\/","title":{"rendered":"From Russian Gas to the Moroccan Pipeline: Has Morocco Entered the Heart of Europe\u2019s Geopolitical Energy Battle?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The platform UNITED24 Media<\/strong> has placed Morocco at the heart of a landscape that goes far beyond Europe\u2019s search for alternatives to Russian gas, presenting the competition over African energy supplies as an extension of the broader geopolitical confrontation between Moscow and Europe. This interpretation takes on particular significance in light of the profound transformation of the European gas market since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war: Russia\u2019s share of EU gas imports has fallen from roughly 45% in 2021 to 12% in 2025, while liquefied natural gas accounted for 45% of total imports, with North Africa assuming an increasingly significant role, representing nearly 13%.<\/p>\n

Yet placing Morocco within this equation requires an essential distinction, so that geopolitical analysis does not blur the difference between gas-producing countries and those whose strategic value lies in controlling or facilitating energy routes. Morocco is not a competitor to Algeria, Nigeria or Egypt in terms of being a major gas producer. Its importance lies instead in its geographical position, its existing and planned infrastructure, and its potential role as a bridge between West Africa and the European market. This is precisely what gives the Atlantic African Gas Pipeline, previously known as the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, a significance extending well beyond the project’s immediate economic dimension.<\/p>\n

The project, led by Nigeria and Morocco through NNPC<\/strong> and ONHYM<\/strong>, is moving into a more advanced phase. Engineering and environmental studies for the Moroccan section have progressed, while the final investment decision is being targeted for the final quarter of 2026. In July, the member states of the Economic Community of West African States signed an intergovernmental agreement in support of the project, which is expected to cross 13 West African countries over approximately 6,900 kilometres, with a potential capacity of up to 30 billion cubic metres per year. Part of the gas would serve the needs of the countries along the route, while another portion could ultimately supply the European market.<\/p>\n

This is where Morocco\u2019s real importance in European calculations becomes clearer: its value does not lie in the volume of gas beneath its soil, but in its potential to become part of the architecture of African energy corridors towards Europe<\/strong>. If the project is completed, Morocco would no longer be merely a consumer or an endpoint of a pipeline. It could become a platform connecting West Africa to North Africa and, beyond that, to the European market. Its geography would consequently become a strategic asset at a time when energy infrastructure itself has become an element of national and geopolitical security.<\/p>\n

Yet this trajectory is not unfolding in isolation. In June 2026, Algeria officially launched construction work on its section of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, linking Nigeria to Niger and then Algeria over approximately 4,128 kilometres, with a potential capacity of up to 30 billion cubic metres per year before connecting to Algeria\u2019s export networks towards Europe. Europe therefore faces two parallel African corridors: an Atlantic route crossing West Africa and Morocco, and a Saharan route passing through Niger and Algeria. Both offer themselves as components of an answer to the same strategic question: where will European gas come from after Russia?<\/p>\n

From this perspective, UNITED24 Media\u2019s assertion that Moscow is seeking to weaken alternative routes becomes easier to understand, but it must also be treated as an analytical reading with a clear geopolitical dimension<\/strong>, rather than as an independently established fact. Demonstrating that Russia is specifically targeting the Moroccan project, or that it has a concrete plan to disrupt a particular energy corridor, would require independent political, security or intelligence evidence that the report itself does not provide. What is clear, however, is that the Sahel has become an increasingly contested geopolitical space, and that Russia has expanded its political and security presence in several countries across the region, at a time when instability itself has become a direct factor in the calculations of investors and infrastructure operators.<\/p>\n

The paradox is that Europe, by reducing its dependence on Russia, has not moved from dependence to complete energy independence. It has largely redistributed its risks<\/strong>. Part of the Russian supply has been replaced by LNG, as well as by imports from Norway, the United States and North Africa, alongside efforts to reduce consumption and accelerate renewable energy deployment. The European Commission says Russia\u2019s share of EU gas imports had fallen to 12% in 2025 and that the bloc intends to phase out Russian gas imports altogether, with Russian LNG imports ending by the end of 2026 and pipeline gas imports by November 2027 at the latest.<\/p>\n

The next energy battle, therefore, will not necessarily be fought over gas fields alone. It will be fought over corridors<\/strong>: who controls the pipeline, who guarantees its security, who can finance its construction and operation, and who ultimately controls access to the markets at the other end. In this equation, Morocco\u2019s importance stems not from its gas reserves, but from its Atlantic coastline, its proximity to Europe, its links with West Africa and the capacity of its infrastructure to become part of a wider continental energy system.<\/p>\n

This is ultimately the deeper meaning of Morocco\u2019s appearance in analyses of the Russian-European competition over African gas. The Kingdom finds itself facing a major strategic opportunity, but also operating within a particularly sensitive arena of geopolitical competition. The success of the Nigeria-Morocco project would mean more than simply bringing new volumes of gas to the European market. It would create a new Atlantic corridor linking West Africa with Europe and make Morocco one of its principal strategic nodes. In a world where energy has become as much an instrument of power as a commodity, the pipeline can sometimes become more strategic than the gas field itself<\/strong>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The platform UNITED24 Media has placed Morocco at the heart of a landscape that goes far beyond Europe\u2019s search for alternatives to Russian gas, presenting the competition over African energy supplies as an extension of the broader geopolitical confrontation between Moscow and Europe. This interpretation takes on particular significance in light of the profound transformation […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":4722,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,43,42,41,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4721","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-asia-americas","category-europe-russia","category-middle-east","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4721","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4721"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4721\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4723,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4721\/revisions\/4723"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4722"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4721"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4721"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4721"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}