{"id":4783,"date":"2026-08-28T18:59:49","date_gmt":"2026-08-28T18:59:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/?p=4783"},"modified":"2026-08-28T19:05:18","modified_gmt":"2026-08-28T19:05:18","slug":"spanish-interior-minister-morocco-knew-nothing-about-the-ceuta-incursion-our-children-and-young-people-are-being-attacked-and-intimidated-who-is-protecting-moroccans","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/spanish-interior-minister-morocco-knew-nothing-about-the-ceuta-incursion-our-children-and-young-people-are-being-attacked-and-intimidated-who-is-protecting-moroccans\/","title":{"rendered":"Spanish Interior Minister: Morocco knew nothing about the Ceuta incursion.. Our children and young people are being attacked and intimidated.. Who is protecting Moroccans?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Occupied Ceuta\u2026 Madrid speaks of \u201ctrust\u201d with Rabat, but who is protecting Moroccans from attacks in the streets?<\/strong><\/h1>\n

The paradox that deserves attention today in occupied Ceuta is not only how tens of thousands of people managed to enter the city within a matter of hours, nor the failure of Spanish and Moroccan intelligence services \u2014 according to the Spanish account \u2014 to anticipate what happened.<\/p>\n

The deeper paradox lies elsewhere.<\/p>\n

Madrid insists that its cooperation with Rabat is based on \u201ctrust\u201d and that Morocco was not responsible for the operation. Yet another scene has been unfolding inside the city itself: Moroccans being chased and attacked, migrant camps being burned, humanitarian aid being blocked, and videos documenting part of this escalation.<\/p>\n

This is where Ceuta\u2019s second story begins.<\/p>\n

A crisis that has changed its nature<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Nearly a month after the mass entry of migrants into occupied Ceuta, the crisis has entered a different phase.<\/p>\n

It is no longer only about borders, numbers, or whether Spanish intelligence had anticipated the operation. The streets themselves have now become part of the confrontation.<\/p>\n

Over the past few days, demonstrations by some local residents have turned into violence targeting migrants, including Moroccans, as well as Red Cross volunteers, journalists and even Muslim citizens of the city.<\/p>\n

Spanish media have shown scenes of tents used by migrants being destroyed and set on fire at Ben\u00edtez beach after protesters crossed a security barrier. In other incidents, demonstrators attempted to prevent food aid from reaching migrants.<\/p>\n

These developments do not require exaggerated political descriptions.<\/p>\n

The images circulating, together with reports from Spanish police and media, are enough to show that the protests have moved beyond a dispute over migration policy and into hostility and violence against people because of their migrant status \u2014 and, in some cases, because of their origin or appearance.<\/p>\n

This raises a different question from the one answered by Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska before the Interior Committee of the Spanish Congress.<\/p>\n

Marlaska was attempting to close one of the most sensitive questions facing Pedro S\u00e1nchez\u2019s government: did the Spanish state know in advance that an operation of this magnitude was about to take place?<\/p>\n

His answer was clear: no.<\/p>\n

According to the minister, Spain\u2019s intelligence services \u2014 including the National Intelligence Centre, CNI, the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre, CIFAS, and the information services of the National Police and Civil Guard \u2014 did not possess information allowing them to anticipate a mass entry on such a scale.<\/p>\n

There had been reports of the usual concerns surrounding irregular migration, he said, but nothing indicated that tens of thousands of people could enter within such a short period.<\/p>\n

Morocco is removed from the equation of responsibility<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Perhaps the most important point is elsewhere.<\/p>\n

The Spanish minister did not blame Morocco.<\/p>\n

Quite the opposite.<\/p>\n

Marlaska defended cooperation with Rabat, describing it as \u201cessential\u201d and based on \u201ctrust\u201d. He recalled that Moroccan authorities, until July 30, had intercepted numerous attempts to enter Ceuta by sea and had carried out extensive containment operations.<\/p>\n

In his appearance before Parliament, he stressed that this cooperation had continued to function throughout July and had contributed to the return of a large proportion of those who entered the city.<\/p>\n

But this account leaves another question hanging.<\/p>\n

If Morocco is considered by Madrid to be a reliable security partner, and if Spain insists that Rabat was neither the author nor the accomplice of the crisis, why did thousands of Moroccans who found themselves inside Ceuta subsequently become exposed to attacks in the streets by groups of local residents?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Two different levels must be separated here.<\/p>\n

The first concerns responsibility for the migrants\u2019 entry.<\/p>\n

The second concerns the responsibility of the state toward people present on its territory.<\/p>\n

Spain can argue that the events of July 30 and 31 were unforeseen. It can defend its border measures. It can investigate crimes allegedly committed by some migrants.<\/p>\n

But none of this gives anyone the right to take the law into their own hands.<\/p>\n

And this distinction is no longer merely a journalistic interpretation.<\/p>\n

Spain\u2019s Minister for Territorial Policy, \u00c1ngel V\u00edctor Torres, himself condemned attacks against migrants, Muslim citizens, Red Cross volunteers, journalists and political figures, calling for a clear message against violence.<\/p>\n

Marlaska also called for an end to all forms of violence, stressing that violence cannot be a solution to the crisis.<\/p>\n

When the street begins to make its own law<\/strong><\/h2>\n

This may be the most worrying development in the current phase.<\/p>\n

In some Ceuta neighbourhoods, calls for migrants to be expelled have reportedly circulated through WhatsApp groups, including messages encouraging people to chase migrants and force them out of neighbourhoods.<\/p>\n

Other reports have described attacks against local residents and journalists being confronted while covering the protests. The tensions are no longer confined to migrants themselves.<\/p>\n

In one particularly revealing episode, Spanish security forces had to intervene to prevent hundreds of protesters from reaching areas where migrants were gathered.<\/p>\n

Tents were set on fire at Ben\u00edtez beach.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Red Cross convoys carrying food intended for migrants were prevented from passing and had to be escorted by police.<\/p>\n

At this point, the issue is no longer simply about migrants.<\/p>\n

It is about the authority of the state.<\/p>\n

The phrase \u201ccooperation based on trust\u201d, repeatedly used by Marlaska, takes on another meaning here.<\/p>\n

From Madrid\u2019s perspective, Morocco is expected to perform a specific task: prevent departures and limit attempts to cross the border. Once people have entered Spanish territory, it is Spain\u2019s responsibility to manage their presence, enforce the law and protect them from attacks.<\/p>\n

This is not an especially complicated diplomatic equation.<\/p>\n

It is the responsibility of a state.<\/p>\n

And if Madrid wants to convince Rabat that the events of July were not an operation prepared on the Moroccan side, the most convincing evidence will not come solely from interception figures or statements about security cooperation.<\/p>\n

It will also come from its ability to demonstrate, on the ground, that a Moroccan present in occupied Ceuta remains subject to Spanish law \u2014 and that attacking him does not become acceptable simply because he entered illegally.<\/p>\n

Rabat\u2019s silence is becoming a question in its own right<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The issue is particularly sensitive because Ceuta is not an ordinary Spanish city in the Moroccan political context.<\/p>\n

Morocco claims sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, while Spain administers them as part of its territory.<\/p>\n

In this context, attacks against Moroccans in Ceuta cannot easily remain isolated criminal incidents. They quickly enter the political memory of relations between the two countries.<\/p>\n

This is where the deepest paradox of the July crisis lies.<\/p>\n

Spain says Morocco is an essential partner. It says Rabat was not responsible for the operation. It stresses that Moroccan cooperation contributed to the return of a very large number of people to Morocco.<\/p>\n

At the same time, images emerging from Ceuta show Moroccans being chased or attacked, their tents destroyed or burned, while food assistance intended for them is blocked.<\/p>\n

The crisis is therefore no longer simply about who opened the road to Ceuta. It is also about what happens to those who crossed it.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The danger becomes greater when the state is no longer the only actor claiming the right to determine what is permitted.<\/p>\n

When groups of citizens begin deciding who deserves food, who should leave a neighbourhood and who may be attacked in the street, the crisis moves beyond migration.<\/p>\n

It reaches the very monopoly of law and public authority.<\/p>\n

For now, the Spanish government says it intends to prevent that evolution. Marlaska has denounced groups seeking to \u201cprovoke hatred and confrontation\u201d, while Torres has called for an end to the violence.<\/p>\n

But a question will impose itself in the coming days:<\/p>\n

Can the Spanish state preserve its monopoly over force and law in a city where some groups of residents are beginning to act as though they themselves have the power to decide the fate of migrants in the streets?<\/strong><\/p>\n

That is probably the real test of this new phase.<\/p>\n

And for Rabat, another problem is emerging.<\/p>\n

Its silence, or the relative weakness of its response to images of attacks against Moroccans in occupied Ceuta, raises another question: if Madrid considers its cooperation with Rabat to be based on \u201ctrust\u201d, does that trust also extend to protecting the dignity of Moroccan citizens when they are in Ceuta, or does cooperation, in practice, stop at the border?<\/p>\n

The July 30 crisis exposed, according to the Spanish Interior Minister\u2019s account, a failure of Spanish security forecasting.<\/p>\n

The August crisis is testing something else: the ability of the Spanish state to prevent anger over migration from turning into violence against people, and the ability of Rabat not to leave its citizens alone in the face of that situation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is the other story taking shape behind the story of the mass entry into Ceuta.<\/p>\n

A story in which the issue is no longer simply a border that temporarily lost control, but a city where, after the momentary collapse of border control, the rule of law and the protection of people have themselves become the real test.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Occupied Ceuta\u2026 Madrid speaks of \u201ctrust\u201d with Rabat, but who is protecting Moroccans from attacks in the streets? The paradox that deserves attention today in occupied Ceuta is not only how tens of thousands of people managed to enter the city within a matter of hours, nor the failure of Spanish and Moroccan intelligence services […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":4784,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,43,42,41,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4783","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-asia-americas","category-europe-russia","category-middle-east","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4783","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4783"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4783\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4786,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4783\/revisions\/4786"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4784"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4783"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4783"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4783"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}