{"id":4906,"date":"2026-09-17T09:18:50","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T09:18:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/?p=4906"},"modified":"2026-09-17T09:33:27","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T09:33:27","slug":"al-sisi-mohammed-bin-salman-egypt-saudi-talks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/al-sisi-mohammed-bin-salman-egypt-saudi-talks\/","title":{"rendered":"Al-Sisi and Mohammed bin Salman in Cairo: Egypt and Saudi Arabia Strengthen Coordination on Gulf Security, Gaza and Economic Cooperation"},"content":{"rendered":"

Cairo –<\/strong> The visit of Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz to Cairo on September 15, 2026, was not merely a protocol-driven stop on the agenda of Egyptian-Saudi relations. It came at an extremely sensitive regional moment, as crises in the Gulf, the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, and Gaza increasingly intersect with growing economic and trade challenges.<\/p>\n

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi received the Saudi Crown Prince in Cairo, where the two leaders held a closed bilateral meeting followed by expanded talks attended by delegations from both countries. The Egyptian president then hosted a luncheon in honor of his Saudi guest and his accompanying delegation. The Egyptian Presidency said the visit was part of efforts to further develop relations between the two countries and to consult on regional and international issues of mutual interest.<\/p>\n

Yet the significance of the meeting extends beyond the format of the visit. The Egyptian statement carried simultaneous political, security, and economic messages, revealing the expanding scope of coordination between Cairo and Riyadh at a time when Gulf security, international maritime navigation, and developments in Gaza, Sudan, and Yemen have become more closely interconnected than ever.<\/p>\n

Security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Political Solidarity Within a Concept of Shared Security<\/strong><\/h2>\n

One of the most prominent outcomes of the talks between Al-Sisi and Mohammed bin Salman was Egypt\u2019s reaffirmation that the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is part of Egypt\u2019s national security. Cairo also reiterated its rejection and condemnation of any attacks or threats affecting the Kingdom\u2019s sovereignty, stability, or territorial integrity, as well as any threat to freedom of navigation in international waterways. Egyptian news website Masrawy reported that the two sides also emphasized the importance of ensuring freedom and security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea.<\/p>\n

This statement carries particular political weight because it links Gulf security and Egyptian security within a single regional framework. Egypt is not a Gulf state, but its geographic position and its role in maritime routes\u2014particularly the Suez Canal and the Red Sea\u2014directly connect it to Gulf security. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is linked to Red Sea security along its western coast and to Gulf security on its eastern side.<\/p>\n

The emphasis on Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Red Sea can therefore be understood as an assessment of the regional security landscape as a chain of interconnected maritime corridors. Any disruption in one of these waterways can affect trade, energy flows, insurance, and shipping far beyond the borders of the country where the threat originates.<\/p>\n

Saudi newspaper Okaz also reported that the Cairo talks reflected agreement on maintaining Egyptian-Saudi relations at their highest levels within the Arab framework, while emphasizing that the security of the Kingdom and the Gulf states constitutes part of Egypt\u2019s national security.<\/p>\n

Cairo and Riyadh Face the Challenge of Maritime Security and Energy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

This part of the statement cannot be separated from the transformations the region has experienced in recent months, as freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Bab el-Mandeb has become directly linked to global energy security and supply chains.<\/p>\n

For Saudi Arabia, the stability of maritime routes is an important component of the security of its energy exports and commercial activity. For Egypt, the stability of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal is directly connected to transit revenues and the country\u2019s position as a major hub for trade between Asia and Europe.<\/p>\n

Egyptian-Saudi coordination on this issue therefore extends beyond security into the global economy. The emphasis on freedom of navigation can be interpreted as an effort to reinforce the principle that the security of international waterways should not become a tool of regional conflict.<\/p>\n

Egypt\u2019s Ahram Gate specifically highlighted the agreement between President Al-Sisi and the Saudi Crown Prince regarding the Egyptian-Saudi position on ensuring freedom and security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea.<\/p>\n

The Economy: Why Did the Two Leaders Talk About Removing Obstacles?<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Masrawy reported that the two sides agreed to increase trade and investment and to elevate economic relations in a manner commensurate with the strength of the historical ties and strategic geographic proximity between the two countries.<\/p>\n

This message comes at a time when economic data point to clear growth in bilateral trade. According to data from Egypt\u2019s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, as reported by Ahram Business, trade between Egypt and Saudi Arabia reached $7.1 billion during the first half of 2026, compared with $5.9 billion during the same period of 2025, representing an increase of 19.7 percent. Egyptian exports to Saudi Arabia also rose to approximately $1.8 billion, while imports reached $5.3 billion.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the figures reveal a relative imbalance in the trade relationship in favor of Saudi Arabia, with Egyptian imports from the Kingdom exceeding Egyptian exports to the Saudi market by more than three times during the first half of the year. This helps explain the significance of the two sides\u2019 discussion about removing obstacles to increased trade. Expanding bilateral trade is not simply a matter of increasing imports; it also raises the question of Egypt\u2019s ability to expand and diversify its exports in the Saudi market.<\/p>\n

Egyptian newspaper Youm7 reported that remittances from Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia reached approximately $12 billion during the 2024\/2025 fiscal year, underscoring the importance of the human dimension in the economic relationship between the two countries alongside trade and investment.<\/p>\n

From Trade to Economic Integration<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The next phase appears to be linked to an effort to move the economic relationship beyond separate flows of trade and investment toward broader forms of integration.<\/p>\n

Data from Egypt\u2019s State Information Service indicate that Saudi Arabia is among the largest Arab investors in Egypt, with thousands of Saudi projects operating across various sectors. Cairo and Riyadh are seeking to expand investment and cooperation in production, services, and supply chains.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, the two countries have opportunities in industries including manufacturing, energy, logistics, tourism, food security, technology, and infrastructure. These sectors have added importance because Egypt\u2019s geographic position provides access to African and European markets, while Saudi Arabia has a substantial investment base and a large regional market as part of its economic transformation under Vision 2030.<\/p>\n

The phrase \u201cremoving obstacles\u201d contained in the joint statement can therefore be understood as a transition from announcing a desire to increase cooperation toward identifying practical implementation mechanisms, whether related to investment procedures, trade, capital flows, or joint projects.<\/p>\n

Palestine: Convergence Between the Egyptian and Saudi Positions<\/strong><\/h2>\n

On the Palestinian issue, the Egyptian statement said that Cairo and Riyadh share identical positions regarding the need to reach a just and comprehensive settlement based on the two-state solution and international legitimacy.<\/p>\n

The two sides also emphasized the need to implement the commitments of the second phase of the U.S. president\u2019s peace plan and UN Security Council Resolution 2803, alongside the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza and an end to Israeli violations in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.<\/p>\n

It is worth noting here that UN Security Council Resolution 2803 was adopted on November 17, 2025. It endorsed a comprehensive plan to end the Gaza war and established a transitional framework that included the creation of a \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d and the formation of a Palestinian technocratic committee, in addition to authorizing a temporary international stabilization force in Gaza.<\/p>\n

In May 2026, a report submitted to the Security Council on implementation of the resolution referred to the continuing role of Egypt, Qatar, T\u00fcrkiye, and the United States as guarantors of the agreement. It also noted that the resolution calls on all parties to implement the plan fully, in good faith, and without delay.<\/p>\n

The renewed Egyptian-Saudi emphasis on Resolution 2803 is therefore more than a legal reference. It reflects an interest in keeping the international framework of the plan present in the political debate, particularly amid continuing disagreements over arrangements for the next phase of the war, the administration of Gaza, and reconstruction.<\/p>\n

Sudan: The Concern Over Preserving State Unity<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Sudan was also present in the Cairo talks, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia reaffirming their support for Sudan\u2019s security and stability, the need for its national institutions to retain exclusive authority, and their rejection of equating the Sudanese Armed Forces with militias or other parallel entities deemed illegitimate, according to Youm7, citing the Egyptian Presidency\u2019s statement.<\/p>\n

This position carries particular significance for Cairo, which views Sudan as a direct extension of its national security, while Riyadh remains engaged with the Sudanese arena through mediation efforts, humanitarian support, and its relations with Gulf actors involved in the crisis.<\/p>\n

Notably, the statement did not frame Sudan simply as a separate internal crisis. Instead, it linked any threat to Sudan\u2019s unity and territorial integrity to the collective security of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the wider region. This reflects an expanding concept of security in Egyptian-Saudi relations\u2014from protecting borders and maritime routes to preventing the fragmentation of Arab states or the emergence of parallel entities capable of reshaping the region\u2019s security landscape.<\/p>\n

Yemen and the Red Sea: Two Interconnected Files<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Regarding Yemen, the meeting reaffirmed Egypt\u2019s support for measures taken by Saudi Arabia to protect its security and stability and to reach a comprehensive and sustainable political solution to the Yemeni crisis, alongside the emphasis on maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.<\/p>\n

The connection between the two issues is clear: Yemen\u2019s stability cannot be separated from Red Sea security, just as maritime security cannot be separated from developments in the Yemeni conflict. Egyptian-Saudi coordination on Yemen therefore has simultaneous security, political, and economic dimensions.<\/p>\n

A Short Visit Carrying Long Messages<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Notably, Mohammed bin Salman\u2019s visit to Cairo did not last several days. He arrived on September 15 and departed on the same day, with President Al-Sisi among those who received and later bid farewell to him. In a message of thanks following his departure, the Crown Prince said the visit and talks had reaffirmed the strength of the fraternal relationship and the shared desire to strengthen cooperation and continue coordination and consultation on issues of mutual interest.<\/p>\n

Yet the brevity of the visit does not necessarily mean that its agenda was limited. The talks brought together Gulf security, maritime navigation, trade, investment, Palestine, Sudan, and Yemen at the same time\u2014issues that alone help explain why the visit included a closed bilateral meeting followed by expanded talks between the two countries\u2019 delegations.<\/p>\n

The timing also carried additional symbolism, coming shortly before Saudi National Day on September 23. Al-Sisi conveyed his congratulations to King Salman, the Crown Prince, and the Saudi people on the occasion, while Mohammed bin Salman expressed his appreciation for the warm welcome and hospitality.<\/p>\n

Cairo and Riyadh: A Partnership Tested by Regional Crises<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Saudi media have portrayed the visit as an extension of an institutionalized path in bilateral relations rather than simply a temporary or circumstantial meeting. Okaz noted that the relationship has entered a more structured phase in recent years, particularly following the establishment of the Saudi-Egyptian Supreme Coordination Council in October 2024 and the signing of an agreement to promote and protect mutual investments.<\/p>\n

In the same context, Al Riyadh viewed the Crown Prince\u2019s visit as taking place at a sensitive regional moment, while highlighting the central position occupied by Cairo and Riyadh within the Arab regional system and the convergence of their interests regarding regional security, maritime navigation, and political issues.<\/p>\n

Egypt\u2019s Youm7 focused in its coverage on the fact that coordination between the two countries extends beyond bilateral relations to broader Arab security issues, noting that Cairo and Riyadh are dealing with interconnected files involving Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, and Red Sea security.<\/p>\n

Mohammed bin Salman\u2019s visit to Cairo can therefore be viewed as a meeting aimed at coordinating interests at a turbulent regional moment, rather than simply a protocol-driven visit. The two countries share interests in Gulf stability, Red Sea security, the continuity of international trade, preventing the fragmentation of Arab states, and supporting a political path for the Palestinian issue.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the next stage will test the ability of this partnership to translate political understandings into measurable economic, security, and diplomatic measures. Bilateral trade is already growing, but Cairo and Riyadh have explicitly spoken about removing obstacles and increasing investment and trade, indicating that their ambitions extend beyond current levels.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Cairo – The visit of Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz to Cairo on September 15, 2026, was not merely a protocol-driven stop on the agenda of Egyptian-Saudi relations. It came at an extremely sensitive regional moment, as crises in the Gulf, the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, and Gaza increasingly […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4907,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[41],"tags":[376,389,383,388,235,379,386,293,125,381,294,377,384,382,378,380,387,200,245,385],"class_list":["post-4906","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-middle-east","tag-al-sisi","tag-arab-security","tag-bab-el-mandeb","tag-economic-cooperation","tag-egypt","tag-egypt-saudi-relations","tag-egypt-saudi-trade","tag-egyptian-national-security","tag-gaza","tag-gulf-security","tag-middle-east","tag-mohammed-bin-salman","tag-palestine","tag-red-sea","tag-saudi-crown-prince","tag-saudi-investments-in-egypt","tag-strait-of-hormuz","tag-sudan","tag-yemen"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4906","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4906"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4906\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4909,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4906\/revisions\/4909"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4907"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4906"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4906"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4906"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}