The report of United Nations Secretary-General Ant\u00f3nio Guterres, dated 1 October 2026, did not need particularly strong political language to expose a clear reality on the ground: after the adoption of Resolution 2797, which reopened the political track and placed Morocco\u2019s autonomy proposal at the centre of the negotiations, military activity did not disappear. One of the clearest incidents occurred in Smara on 5 May 2026, when fire struck a civilian area and injured a civilian.<\/p>\n
Submitted to the Security Council under reference S\/2026\/781<\/strong>, the report does not place the incident merely among competing claims by the parties. MINURSO investigated the incident, recorded two impact craters and projectile fragments, including fragments near a detention centre, and reported one civilian casualty as well as material damage.<\/p>\n Before the report was issued, the United Nations had already treated the 5 May incident as missile fire attributed to the Polisario Front in the vicinity of Smara. On 7 May, the Secretary-General\u2019s office said that his Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, shared MINURSO\u2019s concerns over the attack, after the mission expressed deep concern about fire in civilian areas and called on the parties to avoid any action that could harm the political process.<\/p>\n What gives the Smara incident its weight in Guterres\u2019s report is therefore not simply the fact that a civilian was injured. It is also where the incident falls within the political sequence opened by Resolution 2797.<\/p>\n Adopted by the Security Council on 31 October 2025, the resolution did more than renew MINURSO\u2019s mandate. It called on the parties to engage in negotiations and made Morocco\u2019s autonomy proposal the basis for those negotiations, while retaining the objective of reaching a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. It also stressed the importance of respecting the ceasefire and avoiding any action that could undermine the political process.<\/p>\n Less than seven months after that decision, the Smara fire reached an area where civilians live, rather than an isolated position along the sand berm. That is what gives the incident its particular place in the report: MINURSO established that a civilian had been injured and that material damage had occurred, while the United Nations was simultaneously seeking to use the new political opening to reduce military tensions.<\/p>\n That does not mean the report attributes every military incident to one side. On the contrary, it presents an unstable military situation on both sides of the berm. MINURSO continued to receive reports of Polisario fire toward Moroccan army positions on or near the sand berm, while also receiving reports of Moroccan army drone strikes east of the berm.<\/p>\n The distinction becomes clearer when the claims are measured against investigations.<\/p>\n Between 1 October 2025 and 15 August 2026, the Moroccan army reported 129 incidents of fire west of the berm<\/strong> to MINURSO. The report notes that in most of those cases, the mission was unable to determine where the projectiles had landed or gain access to the locations. The incidents it was able to investigate, with the exception of Smara, occurred in remote areas and did not cause significant damage.<\/p>\n East of the berm, MINURSO continued investigating alleged Moroccan army drone strikes. The report nevertheless records a significant decline in both the number and severity of incidents investigated. Only four drone strikes were investigated during the period under review. Three caused damage to vehicles without any reported deaths or injuries, while the fourth investigation found no evidence that a strike had occurred.<\/p>\n These details prevent the report from being reduced to a military narrative built around one party\u2019s account. At the same time, they give the Smara incident a particular status established by the document itself: a civilian injured in a civilian area<\/strong>, at a moment when Resolution 2797 had just opened a new political window intended to lower the level of military confrontation.<\/p>\n And the report does not stop with the exchange of fire.<\/p>\n MINURSO did not have the same freedom of movement on both sides of the berm.<\/p>\n West of the berm, between 1 October 2025 and 15 August 2026, the mission\u2019s ground patrols travelled approximately 296,164 kilometres<\/strong> and carried out 8,076 visits<\/strong> to Moroccan army positions, units, deployment points and observation sites. The mission also conducted 152 aerial reconnaissance flights<\/strong>.<\/p>\n East of the berm, according to the report, the Polisario Front continued to restrict MINURSO ground patrols to within 20 kilometres of each team site<\/strong>, with additional restrictions in Tifariti and Mijek, where patrols were limited to specified and approved routes.<\/p>\n More importantly, MINURSO helicopter reconnaissance flights remained prohibited east of the berm since November 2020.<\/p>\n That restriction is not simply an operational figure in a UN report. The mission tasked with monitoring the military situation and providing the United Nations with an independent picture of developments on the ground is unable to access some areas according to its own operational requirements. In some cases, its ground convoys require prior authorisation.<\/p>\n At the same time, the Force Commander has continued to be unable to establish direct contact with the Polisario military leadership. Key military communications still take place through written correspondence, while meetings with liaison officers occur at designated locations.<\/p>\n The numbers themselves expose the contrast: MINURSO has been able to travel hundreds of thousands of kilometres and conduct thousands of visits west of the berm, while its movements east remain subject to defined areas and routes, and helicopter reconnaissance has been prohibited there for years.<\/p>\n The report does not conceal the risks posed by strikes, mines and unexploded ordnance either. The mission continued investigating incidents linked to drone strikes, while the UN Mine Action Service continued operations east of the berm, where minefields and areas contaminated by cluster munitions still require clearance.<\/p>\n Even the mission\u2019s financial position forms part of this picture. As of 20 August 2026, assessed contributions outstanding to the MINURSO account stood at approximately $80.3 million<\/strong>, affecting several activities of the mission, including military monitoring, mine action, aviation operations and emergency services.<\/p>\n But the central difficulty identified by the report cannot be reduced to funding.<\/p>\n Guterres describes a conflict that has entered its sixth year of low-intensity hostilities, even as direct contacts between the parties resumed after nearly seven years of interruption. During the first quarter of 2026, three rounds of discussions were held with the participation of Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria and Mauritania, with the support and facilitation of the United Nations and the United States.<\/p>\n Resolution 2797 had given this political dynamic a clear opening. The October report places before the Security Council what happened after that decision: negotiations resumed, but the shooting did not stop; a UN mission continues to operate, but its freedom of movement remains restricted in part of its area of operations; fire continues near the berm; an incident in Smara reached a civilian area; and several drone strikes east of the berm were investigated, against a backdrop of declining numbers and intensity.<\/p>\n It is in this situation that Guterres recommends extending MINURSO\u2019s mandate for another year, until 31 October 2027<\/strong>, while taking account of developments in the political process and warning that the absence of the mission could increase the risk of renewed hostilities.<\/p>\n What the report documents, therefore, is not the collapse of the political process, but its fragility. The negotiations that resumed after years of deadlock have not yet eliminated the exchange of fire. The relative calm has not yet become a fully restored ceasefire. And the mission tasked with monitoring the ground continues to face direct restrictions in part of its area of responsibility.<\/p>\n Against that background, the Smara incident remains one of the clearest facts established in the report: projectiles reached a civilian area, MINURSO established that a civilian had been injured and that material damage had occurred, while the United Nations was simultaneously seeking to use the political opening created by Resolution 2797.<\/p>\n