The \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d movement has returned to New York for a second appearance before the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Its demand touches one of the most sensitive issues surrounding the dispute over the Moroccan Sahara: who has the right to speak on behalf of the Sahrawis, and on what basis can a single political movement claim to represent their positions and aspirations as a whole?<\/p>\n
According to the statement received by Assahifa<\/em>, the movement\u2019s delegation is scheduled to address the committee on Thursday and Friday. It intends to defend a peaceful, political approach to resolving the dispute and to call for recent developments to be used to revive the political process under United Nations auspices.<\/p>\n This is no longer a first appearance. Since its establishment in 2020, \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d has sought to establish a presence in international forums by presenting itself as a political alternative to the Polisario Front, which continues to claim the status of the \u201csole legitimate representative\u201d of the Sahrawis and to advocate self-determination and independence.<\/p>\n The movement\u2019s return carries political significance for its own efforts to gain visibility. It does not, by itself, mean that the United Nations has recognized it as a representative of the Sahrawis, nor does its participation establish that the balance of representation within the UN process has changed. What has happened is more limited: another political voice has been given a platform to present its position. The longer-term significance of that presence will depend on whether it can be sustained and how international actors respond to its demand for broader participation.<\/p>\n The movement says it wants different Sahrawi political currents to be included in dialogue and negotiations rather than having their views confined to a single organization. In its assessment, a lasting settlement requires recognition of the diversity of Sahrawi positions and an opportunity for different voices to contribute to shaping a political solution.<\/p>\n To support its claim that international interest in its proposals is growing, \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d points to contacts with US officials, who it says received its representatives to hear their political project. As presented by the movement, these contacts indicate that discussions have taken place. They do not, on their own, establish a change in the official US position or demonstrate that Washington has adopted the movement\u2019s proposal.<\/p>\n The movement also intends to use the Security Council meeting expected at the end of October to advocate a broader range of consultations and the inclusion of Sahrawi voices that support a peaceful, negotiated settlement. For now, this remains a political demand that the movement is seeking to advance, not a decision already taken by the United Nations.<\/p>\n The significance of this initiative also lies in the solution the movement supports. \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d has previously declared its acceptance of the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco as a basis for a negotiated settlement, while advocating political pluralism and the right of Sahrawis to establish alternative political structures.<\/p>\n That position distinguishes it from the Polisario Front. On 6 October, the Front\u2019s representative to the United Nations, Sidi Mohamed Omar, reiterated its established position before the Fourth Committee, describing the Polisario as the \u201csole legitimate representative\u201d of the Sahrawis and renewing its demand for self-determination and independence, according to the text published by the Polisario\u2019s news agency.<\/p>\n The disagreement therefore concerns more than the formula for a political settlement. \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d is seeking to open debate on plural representation and the possibility of a negotiated solution based on autonomy. The Polisario, meanwhile, continues to defend independence and its claim to exclusive representation.<\/p>\n This divergence could prompt international actors to consider how different Sahrawi political positions might be heard. It does not mean that the emergence of a new movement resolves the dispute or automatically changes the parameters of the UN-led process.<\/p>\n For Morocco, the defence of its territorial integrity and its autonomy initiative remain central to its proposed approach to a political settlement. Whether \u201cSahrawis for Peace\u201d can broaden its reach will depend on the continuity of its political activity, the coherence of its proposals and its ability to give practical substance to its project beyond appearances at international forums.<\/p>\n The Polisario\u2019s claim to exclusive representation must be examined against the wording and legal scope of the relevant UN resolutions and judicial decisions, rather than through interpretations that go beyond the texts themselves.<\/p>\n United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34\/37, adopted on 21 November 1979, recommends in paragraph 7 the full participation of the Polisario Front in the search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution to the question of Western Sahara. It describes the Front as a representative of the people of Western Sahara. However, it does not describe it as their \u201csole\u201d or \u201cexclusive\u201d representative.<\/p>\n The same distinction appears in General Assembly Resolution 35\/19, adopted on 11 November 1980. Paragraph 10 calls on Morocco and the Polisario, as the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations aimed at reaching a definitive settlement. The wording does not explicitly confer exclusive representative status on the Front, nor does it contain a provision prohibiting other Sahrawi political expressions.<\/p>\n The original texts are available through the official United Nations document portal: Resolution 34\/37<\/a> and Resolution 35\/19<\/a>.<\/p>\n The absence of the word \u201csole,\u201d however, should not be stretched into a broader conclusion than the resolutions support. Both texts establish the Polisario\u2019s representative role in the search for a political settlement, but neither designates an alternative movement or automatically grants UN recognition to \u201cSahrawis for Peace.\u201d The absence of an explicit recognition of exclusivity is not the same as recognition of another movement as a representative. These are separate questions.<\/p>\n A further legal distinction appears in the judgment delivered on 4 October 2024 by the Court of Justice of the European Union in joined cases C\u2011779\/21 P and C\u2011799\/21 P. In paragraph 89, the Court states that the Polisario has not been formally recognized as the exclusive representative of the people of Western Sahara. It nevertheless acknowledges the Front\u2019s particular standing in the UN-led process concerning the territory\u2019s future status, as well as its participation in other international forums to defend the right to self-determination.<\/p>\n The distinction matters. The Court did not deny the Polisario\u2019s role in the UN process, nor did it treat the Front as having no standing. It distinguished its particular position within that process from formal recognition as the exclusive representative.<\/p>\n Conversely, the judgment does not amount to judicial recognition of \u201cSahrawis for Peace,\u201d nor does it determine the legitimacy of the movement\u2019s political project. The proceedings concerned challenges to agreements concluded between the European Union and Morocco and their legal effects. They were not intended to determine which organization should be designated the sole political representative of the Sahrawis.<\/p>\nAutonomy places the movement before a different political test<\/h2>\n
What do UN resolutions actually say about Sahrawi representation?<\/h2>\n