The United States circulated the blue version of the draft Security Council resolution on the Sahara on 29 October, ahead of the vote scheduled for Friday, 30 October, on the eve of the expiry of the current mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO, on 31 October. The text followed several rounds of consultations among Council members, resulting in the preservation of the American draft’s main political orientations while revising several provisions that had envisaged a rapid and far-reaching transformation of the UN mission.<\/p>\n
The issue that deserves closer examination goes beyond the routine renewal of an international mission’s mandate for another year. It concerns the nature of the framework expected to guide the next phase of negotiations. According to reports on the latest version of the text, the draft retains Morocco’s expanded and updated autonomy proposal as the sole basis for negotiations. It also envisages a reorganisation of the UN mission’s future and opens consultations to a wider range of Sahrawi constituencies beyond the political parties traditionally involved in the negotiating process.<\/p>\n
This wording differs from Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025, which called for negotiations on the basis of Morocco’s autonomy proposal without describing it as the sole basis. The earlier resolution combined recognition of the Moroccan initiative as the foundation for discussions with the possibility for the parties to put forward other constructive proposals. The new wording, as reported in the available accounts, moves towards narrowing the reference framework for negotiations: responding to the Moroccan initiative and examining its substance become the defined starting point for the process.<\/p>\n
The distinction between the two formulations matters when assessing the evolution of the Council’s approach. Adopting an initiative as a basis for negotiations leaves more room for parallel reference frameworks. Describing it as the sole basis places the parties within a more clearly defined negotiating framework and directs discussion towards the substance of autonomy, its powers, institutional safeguards, mechanisms for managing local affairs and the relationship between local institutions and central state authorities.<\/p>\n
However, the exclusivity of the negotiating framework should not be confused with a final settlement of the dispute. According to the reported wording, the draft does not constitute a final agreement on sovereignty or a completed settlement. Rather, it defines the framework within which negotiations are expected to proceed, while retaining the reference to a mutually acceptable political solution and the principle of self-determination.<\/p>\n
This distinction is essential. Morocco’s position in the next phase will also depend on its ability to translate the autonomy initiative into a coherent institutional framework, detailed enough to support substantive negotiations rather than relying solely on its political significance.<\/p>\n
The second development concerns the institutional identity of the UN mission. The draft proposes changing the name of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO, to the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara, abbreviated as MINUSO, effective 1 November 2026.<\/p>\n
The current name dates back to Security Council Resolution 690 of 1991, which established the mission under the settlement plan that included a referendum to determine the territory’s final status. That referendum was never held because of persistent disagreements over its conditions and the criteria for identifying the eligible electorate. The mission nevertheless continued to perform other functions, particularly monitoring the ceasefire, maintaining contacts with the parties and supporting the UN-led process.<\/p>\n
The proposed name change carries institutional and political significance. It removes the direct reference to a referendum from the mission’s official title and is consistent with an approach that places the political process and negotiations more firmly at the centre of the next phase.<\/p>\n
Accuracy, however, requires distinguishing a change of name from the abandonment of the principle of self-determination. The former concerns the mission’s designation and institutional organisation; the latter remains part of the legal and political framework invoked by the Security Council in addressing the dispute. It would therefore be inaccurate to present the removal of the word \u201creferendum\u201d from the mission’s name as automatically eliminating every UN reference to self-determination.<\/p>\n
Nor does the draft stop at a change of designation. It asks the Secretary-General to submit detailed proposals concerning the mission’s structure, personnel and resources. These proposals may include closing or merging certain field locations, reviewing the number of uniformed personnel, adjusting ceasefire-monitoring arrangements, addressing mine-related activities and supporting the political process.<\/p>\n
According to Yabiladi’s comparison of the different draft versions, the revised text removed the original provision requiring a reduction of at least 50 per cent in uniformed personnel by 31 January 2027. It also removed automatic deadlines that had envisaged ending the peacekeeping mission in April 2027 and transforming it into a special political mission.<\/p>\n
Instead, the draft requests detailed proposals before 30 January 2027, while leaving the Security Council with the authority to decide the mission’s future and any change to its mandate, taking into account the proposals submitted and progress in the political process.<\/p>\n
This revision shows that discussions within the Council are not confined to the substance of a political settlement. They also concern the nature of the UN presence itself. Moving from a framework with fixed deadlines for reducing the military presence to one based on an assessment by the Secretary-General and a subsequent Council decision means that restructuring is being treated as an open institutional process rather than an automatic measure.<\/p>\n
Another provision deserves particular attention: the proposed expansion of consultations conducted by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura.<\/p>\n
According to reports on the revised text, the draft moves towards tasking the Personal Envoy with engaging a broad range of Sahrawi constituencies, including those in Morocco’s southern provinces, the Tindouf camps and the Sahrawi diaspora abroad.<\/p>\n
This approach goes beyond limiting contacts to the political actors traditionally identified in the negotiating process. It creates an opportunity to hear a wider range of social and political perspectives, concerns and priorities that may be reflected in reports submitted by the Personal Envoy to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.<\/p>\n
The issue is not simply about adding names to a consultation list. Political representation and social representation are not identical, and it cannot be assumed that one political organisation necessarily encompasses all the views and choices present among the different Sahrawi constituencies.<\/p>\n
For Morocco, this approach provides an opportunity to highlight the plurality of expressions and political choices within Sahrawi society and to demonstrate that discussion of the future of the southern provinces should not be confined to the discourse of a single political actor. Legally, however, it does not mean that the draft has decided to exclude the Polisario Front from negotiations or withdraw its status as a party involved in the UN process.<\/p>\n
The distinction is necessary. The draft refers to expanding consultations, not to a decision redefining the legal status of all parties. The practical impact of this opening will depend on the individuals and organisations consulted, the criteria used to select them, the questions put to them and the way their positions are reflected in UN reporting.<\/p>\n
A wider range of interlocutors could enrich the information available to the Security Council when assessing the positions of the constituencies concerned with the region’s future. It does not, by itself, create an alternative representative mechanism to replace negotiations between the parties.<\/p>\n
On the humanitarian front, the revised draft includes a provision calling for the completion of refugee registration in the Tindouf area within six months, in accordance with international law and the standards of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.<\/p>\n
The significance of this issue extends beyond the administrative process of registration. It relates to demographic information, the identification of humanitarian needs, the organisation of protection and assistance, and the assessment of durable solutions.<\/p>\n
Registration should not, however, be presented as a mere formality or as a political instrument detached from its humanitarian purpose. Its implementation requires access to the people concerned, freedom of movement, respect for international standards and cooperation with the UN refugee agency.<\/p>\n
Nor does setting a deadline mean that the process will automatically be completed. Its results will depend on implementation conditions, safeguards on the ground and cooperation by the relevant actors.<\/p>\n
Reports by Hespress and Yabiladi indicate that this provision was retained in the revised text, with a six-month deadline and a supervisory role for the UN refugee agency.<\/p>\n
The blue draft should also be read without assuming that it emerged from a complete and final agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council.<\/p>\n
The available information does not establish that the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom reached a final consensus on every provision of the draft. Negotiations included reservations and disagreements over certain formulations, particularly the mission’s future, the UN’s role in leading the political process and the proposed deadlines for restructuring.<\/p>\n
Hespress reported, citing a UN source, that the amendments reaffirmed the central role of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy following reservations about the initial version, which had assigned a more prominent role to the United States in facilitating discussions.<\/p>\n
Russia, for its part, expressed support for extending the mission’s mandate while indicating that its final position on the draft would depend on the outcome of negotiations among Council members. This should not be interpreted as definitive Russian support for every provision of the text.<\/p>\n
The Polisario Front, meanwhile, announced in a letter dated 22 October 2026 that it rejected the initial draft. It argued that the text departed from the foundations of the UN process and raised the possibility of withdrawing from the political process if the draft were adopted without substantial changes.<\/p>\n
Regardless of how its arguments are assessed, this position demonstrates that the American wording has become the subject of political and legal disagreement among the parties concerned, and that the amendments were not merely editorial adjustments.<\/p>\n
It is also important to distinguish the initial draft from the blue version. The revised text removed certain provisions that had envisaged more binding measures, including a reduction in military personnel according to a specified percentage and the possibility of additional measures against parties that failed to engage constructively in the political process.<\/p>\n
At the same time, it retained the reference to Morocco’s autonomy initiative as the basis for negotiations, the proposed redefinition of the mission’s name and functions, and the expansion of consultations to include a wider range of Sahrawi constituencies.<\/p>\n
This distinction matters when assessing the negotiations within the Council: agreement on certain provisions does not necessarily mean agreement on every political consequence that may follow from them.<\/p>\n
Since Morocco presented its autonomy initiative in 2007, the central challenge has been to move the debate beyond general political positions towards an institutional framework that can be examined and negotiated, with clearly defined powers and specific safeguards.<\/p>\n
If adopted in the reported terms, the new draft wording will give this requirement greater prominence in the next phase. Recognising the Moroccan initiative as the sole basis for negotiations places its substance at the centre of discussions and makes it necessary to clarify the nature of the institutions responsible for managing local affairs, the scope of their powers, their election and accountability mechanisms, their relationship with state institutions, and the constitutional and legal safeguards governing the exercise of autonomy.<\/p>\n
The expansion of consultations also requires Morocco’s approach to engage with the different Sahrawi constituencies as participants in the debate over the future of the Kingdom’s southern provinces. This means presenting a framework capable of accommodating social, political and economic diversity without reducing society to a single organisation or voice.<\/p>\n
At the international level, defending the Moroccan initiative remains linked to the presentation of legal, institutional and political arguments, as well as the ability to explain its substance to states and international organisations. It cannot rest solely on recording favourable diplomatic positions.<\/p>\n
One final point must be kept in mind ahead of the vote: even in its blue version, the draft is not yet an operative Security Council resolution. The Council’s final position will only be established after the vote and the formal adoption of the text. Some formulations may still be subject to changes during the final stage of negotiations.<\/p>\n
For Morocco, the phase that this draft could open, if adopted, will place the autonomy initiative before a more concrete test: how to translate a political framework into a clearly defined institutional architecture, how to turn diplomatic positions into a negotiating process capable of implementation, and how to ensure that the different Sahrawi constituencies are heard in the UN debate on the future of the Kingdom’s southern provinces.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The United States circulated the blue version of the draft Security Council resolution on the Sahara on 29 October, ahead of the vote scheduled for Friday, 30 October, on the eve of the expiry of the current mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO, on 31 October. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":5097,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[39,43,42,41,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5096","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-africa","category-asia-americas","category-europe-russia","category-middle-east","category-the-maghreb"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5096","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5096"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5096\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5098,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5096\/revisions\/5098"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5097"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5096"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5096"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/diplomatique.ma\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5096"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}