The preliminary US draft resolution on the Moroccan Sahara opens the prospect of a substantial reconfiguration of the United Nations framework. According to details reported after the text circulated, Washington is proposing to make autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty the only viable solution, end MINURSO’s military component in April 2027, and subsequently transform the mission into a special political presence whose mandate would expire in October of the same year. If retained in the final text, these provisions would represent a significant shift. They do not, however, establish that autonomy will be fully implemented within a year or that the Polisario Front will be permanently excluded from any settlement process.
The issue goes beyond changing the name of a UN mission. The US proposal, details of which were reported by the press on October 22, 2026, appears to seek a redefinition of the UN instrument that has accompanied the conflict since 1991. It would combine a gradual reduction in the military presence with a political repositioning of the mission, while placing negotiations increasingly around Morocco’s autonomy initiative. The proposal must therefore be assessed through its actual provisions, its timetable and its legal status, rather than through the expectations generated by its disclosure.
From the 2025 resolution to the 2026 draft: a shift in the political framework
The starting point for assessing the US proposal is Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on October 31, 2025. The resolution extended MINURSO’s mandate until October 31, 2026, and expressed full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in facilitating negotiations on the basis of Morocco’s autonomy proposal, with the aim of reaching a just and lasting political solution acceptable to the parties. It also requested a strategic review of the mission’s future within six months of the mandate’s renewal.
The resolution strengthened the position of Morocco’s initiative within the negotiations while retaining the language of a mutually acceptable political solution and the reference to self-determination. The new US draft would go a step further if it retained wording identifying autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the only viable solution. That proposed change in language, more than the administrative restructuring of MINURSO alone, is the central political issue.
This shift did not begin in October 2026. It follows a diplomatic process in which Morocco’s autonomy initiative has progressively consolidated its position in international discussions.
Published reports refer to three direct ministerial meetings held in 2026 in Washington and Madrid, involving Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria and Mauritania, with US and UN mediation. These meetings demonstrate that diplomatic engagement has continued, but they do not establish that the parties have reached a final agreement on the substance of autonomy or the mechanisms required to implement it.
Moving from a preferred negotiating framework to an operational settlement requires answers to institutional, legal, administrative and financial questions. The existence of diplomatic meetings alone cannot establish that these issues have been resolved.
Renaming MINURSO: a political signal that does not, by itself, settle self-determination
One of the most discussed elements of the draft is the proposed removal of the reference to a referendum from the name of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO.
The reference was never merely a matter of terminology. The mission was established in 1991 under Security Council Resolution 690 as part of the settlement plan accepted at the time by Morocco and the Polisario Front. Its mandate included functions related to preparing a referendum, monitoring the ceasefire and carrying out other tasks associated with the settlement process.
If the Security Council approves the removal of the referendum reference, the change would reflect an evolution in the mission’s institutional description. Combined with a shift from military monitoring to political engagement, it could mark a significant change in how the United Nations approaches its operational role.
Three levels must nevertheless be distinguished: the mission’s name, the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council, and the broader legal and political framework of the dispute. Changing the first does not, on its own, establish that all references to self-determination have disappeared from the UN system, nor does it prove that every aspect of the final status has been conclusively settled.
The actual significance of the change will depend on the adopted text and on how it connects the mission’s mandate to the political process.
April and October 2027: a timetable for the mission, not a guaranteed deadline for autonomy
According to details published after the draft was reviewed, the US proposal envisages two stages. The peacekeeping component would end on April 30, 2027. From May 1, the mission would become a special political presence until October 31, 2027. The draft would also provide for a gradual reduction in the military component, including a cut of at least 50 percent in authorized uniformed personnel by January 31, 2027.
If adopted, these provisions would give the United Nations a compressed timetable for reorganizing its presence: reducing military personnel, redefining the mission’s mandate and ending the temporary political phase in October 2027.
But the termination of a UN mandate and the implementation of an autonomy arrangement are two different processes. Based on the available reporting, the draft establishes deadlines for the future of MINURSO. It does not demonstrate that the institutions of autonomy, their powers, their relationship with central authorities, their resources or their legal safeguards have already been defined and are ready to operate.
The available information therefore does not establish October 2027 as a formal deadline for the full implementation of autonomy. That date appears instead to mark the proposed end of the mission’s temporary political phase. The timetable for any final settlement will depend on the negotiations and subsequent decisions.
Registration of the Tindouf camps: a claim that requires explicit wording
In her video, Rowaida Mroue states that the US draft calls for the registration of residents of the Tindouf camps by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, regardless of opposition from Algeria or the Polisario Front.
This is an important political and humanitarian issue. However, the available reporting on the draft does not establish that it contains an explicit provision requiring such a registration exercise, or that it provides the UN refugee agency with a mechanism to carry it out by force. Without the full text and verifiable wording, the claim cannot be presented as an established US decision.
The statistical issue is longstanding. In a statement published on September 28, 2018, the UN refugee agency explained that it used a planning figure of 90,000 people to estimate the needs of the most vulnerable populations in the Tindouf camps. An additional food allocation for 35,000 people had been maintained since 2006 pending a full registration exercise. These figures were humanitarian planning estimates, not the results of a comprehensive census.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish registration for protection purposes, estimates of humanitarian needs and a full demographic census. These exercises serve different purposes and do not necessarily carry the same legal or practical implications.
If the US text does contain a new provision on population registration, its significance will depend on the precise wording, the authority responsible for implementation, the cooperation required from the relevant authorities and the safeguards provided to people receiving humanitarian protection.
To state at this stage that a census will be imposed on Algeria, or that it has definitively become part of the forthcoming resolution, would go beyond the available evidence.
The Polisario Front objects: has it actually withdrawn from negotiations?
Rowaida Mroue refers to a threat by the Polisario Front to withdraw from the negotiating process and interprets it as evidence that the US proposal confronts the movement with a new political reality, leaving it no choice but to accept autonomy.
The Polisario Front’s response is important to understanding the tensions surrounding the draft. But opposition to its provisions does not necessarily amount to an actual and definitive withdrawal from the UN process.
According to reports published on October 22, the Polisario Front’s representative to the United Nations, Sidi Mohamed Omar, sent a letter challenging the proposal and describing it as a serious departure from international law. He reportedly linked continued participation to substantial amendments to the text.
Such a position indicates disagreement over the draft’s content and the conditions of negotiation. It does not, in itself, prove that the Polisario Front has definitively left the process.
The positions of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, along with the diplomatic calculations of Security Council members, will continue to shape the outcome. Russia and China, in particular, have significant influence within the Council. It would nevertheless be premature to attribute a definitive position on the proposal to either country without an official statement or a documented vote.
A US draft does not become a Security Council resolution simply because it has circulated among diplomats or been reported by the press. It remains subject to consultations, amendments and diplomatic negotiations. Some provisions, deadlines and obligations may change before a vote takes place.
Where does Morocco’s initiative stand?
The most favourable interpretation for Morocco rests on one specific point: autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty may no longer be presented as one option among several, but as the exclusive framework around which Washington seeks to organize a settlement. If this wording survives in the final text, it would represent a significant diplomatic development.
The next phase, however, would raise questions different from those involved in establishing the political reference point. An expanded autonomy arrangement would require the definition of institutions responsible for local affairs, their powers, their relationship with central authorities, the representation of populations in the Kingdom’s southern provinces, the financial and administrative resources required, and the legal safeguards needed for durable implementation.
The existence of negotiating meetings or references to an expanded version of Morocco’s 2007 proposal does not establish that these questions have already been resolved. That would require access to the updated initiative, any negotiating documents agreed by the parties and the final wording of the Security Council resolution.
A further distinction must be maintained between the position of the United States, which is leading the drafting process, and that of the Security Council as a collective body with authority to adopt, amend or reject the text. Washington can seek to strengthen the position of Morocco’s initiative, but it cannot predetermine every decision of the Council.
A resolution that has yet to be adopted
As of October 23, 2026, the available information supports describing the US text as a draft intended to make Moroccan autonomy the exclusive framework for negotiations, change MINURSO’s name, end its military component in April 2027 and transform the mission into a temporary political presence through October of that year.
The same information does not justify presenting these provisions as an operative UN resolution, asserting that autonomy will be fully implemented within a year, or treating registration in the Tindouf camps as a definitively established obligation.
The decisive test will come with the final text: which provisions survive, which are amended, what obligations are assigned to the parties, and whether the Council establishes a sufficiently precise implementation mechanism or limits itself to defining the political framework for negotiations.
The answers to these questions, rather than the expectations generated by the draft’s disclosure, will determine the actual scale of the change.
