The Revolution of Democratic Monarchy: Does the Monarchy Need Stronger Institutions in Order to Become Stronger?
On the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People, Younes Meskine places the reader before a question that goes far beyond the commemoration itself: what if the relationship between monarchy and democracy in Morocco were not one of contradiction, but rather part of a historical project whose possibilities have not yet been exhausted?
August 20, 1953, was not the starting point of the relationship between the Throne and the national movement. Rather, it was the moment when a process that had begun much earlier crystallized—when nationalists chose to link the struggle for national liberation to the continuity of the Moroccan state and the legitimacy of the King, rather than turning independence into a rupture with the institution that embodied Moroccan sovereignty.
This reading has a genuine historical foundation. The 1944 Independence Manifesto associated the demand for independence and territorial unity under the leadership of the King with the call for a consultative political system guaranteeing rights and duties. The connection between monarchy and political reform is therefore not a contemporary invention; it already appeared in one of the founding texts of the national movement.
This is where the deeper meaning of Meskine’s article begins. He does not place the monarchy against democracy. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate that the historical legitimacy of the Throne can, politically and historically, provide a foundation for stronger representative institutions.
Yet when he presents the government of Abdallah Ibrahim as a moment in which Morocco might have begun moving toward a parliamentary monarchy, only for that trajectory to be subsequently interrupted, he moves from historical fact into an interpretation that requires further substantiation. The existence of the Abdallah Ibrahim government between 1958 and 1960 is established; presenting it necessarily as the beginning of an alternative parliamentary trajectory, however, remains a particular reading of history.
The same caution applies when he returns to the political alternation of 1998. Meskine sees it as a period during which the monarchy would have reconnected with a historic opposition, entrusting the government to Abderrahmane Youssoufi. The interpretation is politically defensible, but it cannot be presented as the sole explanation. The alternation also emerged within a complex economic and political context, marked by fears of a broader national impasse and by the need to reorganize relations between power, society, and institutions.
The article then reaches the reign of Mohammed VI, linking the strength of the monarchical institution to what Meskine describes as the “legitimacy of the humane King.” Here, the argument intersects with a clearly affirmed institutional evolution since the 2011 Constitution, which defines Morocco as a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary, and social monarchy, and establishes the separation, balance, and cooperation of powers, together with the principle that responsibility must be accompanied by accountability.
The Constitution also establishes the King as the symbol of the unity of the Nation, the guarantor of the permanence and continuity of the State, and the guardian of respect for democratic choice.
But the most sensitive question in the article comes next: if the monarchy is strong, what happens when political parties, Parliament, government, and political mediation become weak?
The debate then moves beyond the strength of the monarchical institution itself and toward the political cost of weakness among the institutions surrounding it. When elected institutions fail to generate sufficient representation, trust, and accountability, society tends to attribute responsibility for dysfunction to the State as a whole. The monarchy can then end up bearing part of a political cost that should normally be carried by executive and representative institutions.
This argument deserves serious discussion, particularly because indicators of political trust are not especially reassuring. Recent Afrobarometer data nevertheless show that a majority of Moroccans continue to regard elections as the mechanism through which leaders are chosen, while trust in political parties and elected representatives remains more fragile.
The problem, therefore, is not necessarily a rejection of electoral democracy. It lies more deeply in the perception that representative institutions do not always deliver the political results citizens expect from them.
This is precisely where a distinction must be made between criticism of institutions and sweeping accusation. Speaking of “interest groups” that allegedly use their proximity to power to protect their positions can constitute a legitimate subject for journalistic investigation. But such an assertion becomes far more powerful when supported by names, cases, facts, figures, and identifiable mechanisms. Without that evidentiary foundation, the analysis risks becoming broader than the evidence available to sustain it.
The title of the article can therefore be understood differently.
The “revolution of democratic monarchy” should not mean a revolution against the monarchy, nor a transformation of the nature of the State. It could instead refer to a reactivation of the democratic dimension within the constitutional monarchy itself.
This interpretation finds support in Morocco’s constitutional architecture since 2011, which has strengthened the role of Parliament, established the accountability of the government emerging from the parliamentary majority, affirmed the separation of powers, and consolidated the principle of accountability.
The real question left by Meskine’s article is therefore not: Should Morocco choose between monarchy and democracy?
That debate has already been overtaken by the Moroccan constitutional framework.
The far more difficult question is this:
Can elected institutions become strong enough to fully exercise their constitutional responsibilities without that strength being interpreted as a weakening of the monarchy?
If we reason from the constitutional logic itself, the answer is yes.
The King does not need a weak government in order to be strong, just as the monarchy does not need a weak Parliament to preserve its legitimacy. The Constitution places the King in the role of guarantor of the continuity of the State, national unity, and democratic choice, while assigning elected and executive institutions specific powers and responsibilities.
The “revolution” evoked by Meskine therefore becomes far less radical than the word suggests—and much more institutional than the title initially implies.
It would mean restoring political parties’ capacity to represent citizens; restoring substantive political meaning to elections; enabling government to exercise its responsibilities fully; allowing Parliament to recover its legislative and oversight functions; ensuring that administration remains subject to the rule of law; and preventing economic weight from being transformed into political power.
If this were achieved, the result would not be a weaker monarchy, but a monarchy less exposed to the consequences of failures committed by other political actors.
Democracy would not become an alternative to monarchy. It would become one of the mechanisms through which the State preserves and renews its legitimacy.
Perhaps this is the strongest interpretation of what the journalist is trying to say, even if he does not formulate it with this degree of precision: the objective is not to rebuild Morocco outside the monarchy, but to rebuild the political space within it; not to reduce the place of the Throne, but to free the monarchy from the political burden created by weak institutions.
This is therefore not a revolution against the monarchy.
If we accept this reading, it is an attempt to remove the monarchy from the weight of day-to-day politics and return political responsibility to the institutions to which the Constitution assigns it.
In this precise sense, the title “The Revolution of Democratic Monarchy” becomes defensible:
a monarchy strong through its legitimacy, institutions strong through their constitutional powers, and a people no longer asked to choose between stability and democracy—because both must be components of the same State.
